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Intermediaries in power-laden retail supply chains: An opportunity to improve buyer-
supplier relationships and collaboration 
 
Abstract 
Despite the benefits of buyer and seller collaboration and hence relationships extolled in 
extensive studies, issues of relationship power inhibit implementation of collaborative and 
relational approaches, particularly in some parts of the retail sector. Further, most research 
regards buyer-supplier collaboration and relations as dyadic or focal relationships, or perhaps 
in a network context, and typically investigates buyer-supplier collaboration and relations 
from a power-dependency perspective; and within vertical supply integration. Little attention 
has been given to the potential role of supply chain intermediaries, such as logistics service 
providers, in objectively and independently determining and managing the course of buyer-
supplier collaboration and relations in a business-to-business context. This article appraises 
the potential role of buyer-supplier collaboration and relations and their relevant 
opportunities in the power-laden, contentious environment of the retail grocery sector. With 
an interdisciplinary approach, drawn from supply management, relationship management, 
and logistics and supply chain management, this article emphasises the importance of 
horizontal collaboration using fourth-party logistics structures as horizontal intermediary 
conduits, who act independently between retailers and suppliers to facilitate collaborative and 
relational activity. 
 
Keywords: buyer-supplier relationships, horizontal and vertical collaboration, logistics 
service providers, intermediary, retail grocery sector. 
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1. Introduction 
Research into business-to-business relationships is not new. On the demand—that is, 
customer or buyer side—relationship management and relationship marketing have long 
provided principal theories for understanding dyadic, buyer–supplier relationships (e.g., 
Håkansson & Snehota, 1982; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Möller & Halinen, 2000; Lindgreen & 
Wynstra, 2005). The stream of such literature acts as an umbrella and covers a wide, 
interlinked set of issues such as interpersonal and inter-organizational relations, power 
dependence, trust, and collaboration, in a downstream direction of travel from suppliers 
toward buyers (Wilson, 1995; Frazier, 1983; Jain et al., 2013; Meehan & Wright, 2013). 
 There is also a large body of work on the supply—that is, supplier side—focusing 
on supplier assessment, collaboration, and segmentation (e.g., Kraljic, 1983; Ulaga & Eggert, 
2006; Roseira, Brito, & Henneberg, 2010). However, the reverse application of relationship 
management—that is, from buyers to suppliers and key supply relationship development—
remains largely lacking. One notable exception is a study by Lindgreen et al. (2013) that 
develops a novel instrument to measure an organization’s use of transaction purchasing, 
electronic purchasing, interactive purchasing, and network purchasing. 
 Further, there is evidence that relationships between buyers and suppliers do not 
often adhere to notions of good, collaborative relationship practices (Spekman, Kamauff, & 
Myhr, 1998; Robson & Rawnsley, 2001; Hingley, Lindgreen, & Casswell, 2006). One 
notable example is the UK retail grocery sector, where retailers have been accused of using 
predatory practices with suppliers and exercising the power they achieved from suppliers 
during a transfer from the 1980s onwards (Grant, 2005; Hingley, 2005; Fernie & Grant, 
2008). This work supports Cox (2004), who identified supply chain management as the most 
intensive resource (i.e., cost, requirement for buyers and suppliers), and that supplier 
development and supply chain management work best in situations where buyers have 
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dominance or power over suppliers, or where there is interdependence in the power 
relationships between them.  
 And yet, distribution efficiencies in grocery retail have improved over the last 30 
years to the benefit of both retailers and suppliers (Frankel, Goldsby, & Whipple, 2002; 
Fernie & McKinnon, 2003; Fernie & Grant, 2008). Many of these efficiency achievements 
have been predicated on the use of intermediaries such as logistics service providers, who 
provide transport and storage in food supply chains, to serve as objective, ‘honest brokers’ 
and who do not wield power in distribution and relationship processes in order to maintain 
balance and fairness, as well as efficiency and effectiveness, in the grocery supply chain 
(Mukhopadhyay, 2006; Potter, Mason, & Lalwani, 2006; Mason, Lalwani, & Boughton, 
2007). 
 Thus, there is a conundrum that much current work emphasises relationship-
building activities on both the demand and the supply side while other work provides  
evidence that demonstrates—in, for example, retailing and supply chain management—that 
the use of power, the existence of asymmetrical relationships, etc. are widespread. In other 
words, preaching the usage of relationships seems at odds with what is actually being 
practiced. Logistics service providers work as connectors between the supply and the demand 
side and are less inclined to use power. This has been observed in Hingley et al. (2011) 
whose empirical investigation concerned retailer organisations and logistics service 
providers; it was the logistics service providers who were more open to engagement and were 
prepared to facilitate connections; whereas retailers were less enthusiastic and feared loss of 
power and control.  
 Accordingly, we investigate the collaborative role and related practices of such 
intermediaries to enhance our understanding of reducing the influence of one-way power in 
buyer-supplier relationships in vertical supply chain structures, especially in the grocery retail 
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sector. This article thus contributes to the supply chain and buyer-supplier relationship 
literature by providing further explanation of dyadic and triadic relations, networks, and the 
coordination of supply. We first discuss the role of intermediaries as channel moderators, 
facilitators, and gatekeepers, and then the characteristics and issues related to collaboration 
that arise from our investigation of retailers, suppliers, and intermediaries in the UK grocery 
retailing sector. We next propose insights into how intermediaries known as fourth-party 
logistics service providers (herein after termed 4PLs) might catalyse horizontal collaboration 
and serve as ‘honest brokers’ in buyer-supplier relationship development and finally conclude 
with managerial implications, limitations of this article, and suggestions for further research. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
2.1. Relationship theory: Buyer and supplier perspectives 
Many relationship and network theorists have highlighted the importance of relationships in 
business network contexts (Anderson, Håkansson, & Johanson, 1994; Håkansson & Snehota, 
1995; Becker, 2008), with the contention that individual organisations and dyadic 
relationships both contribute to networks of inter-relationships, built on trust and 
commitment, which in turn derives from shared values and information, mutual dependence, 
communication, and relationship benefits (Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Spekman et al., 1998; 
Wilson, 1995; Lindgreen, 2003; Jain et al., 2013). 
From a buyer’s perspective, supplier selection criteria include the supplier’s internal 
integration, collaboration, trust, and commitment capabilities. Supplier criteria also focus on 
information sharing, performance on both product and financial levels, and the supplier’s 
ability to learn and grow with the buyer (Spekman et al., 1998; Liker & Choi, 2004; Samiee 
& Walters, 2006). A successful supplier strategy contains four basic operational dimensions: 
identifying, analyzing, selecting suitable strategies for, and developing operational-level 
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capabilities to maintain profitable long-term relationships with key accounts (Ojasalo, 2001). 
These operational dimensions reflect some of the supplier-side selection criteria, reinforcing 
the notion of collaboration between the two sides in a buyer–supplier dyad. 
 
2.2. Power in buyer-supplier relationships 
Power in buyer-seller relationships has been defined as the potential or ability of one channel 
(or supply chain) member to influence decisions of another channel (or supply chain) 
member (Frazier, 1983; Kumar, 2005; Meehan & Wright, 2013). The inappropriate or 
predatory use of power (i.e., where there is an adversarial relationship due to the unequal 
share of value appropriation in a relationship; Cox [2004]) leads to overall inefficiencies and 
ineffectiveness in supply chains. For example, buyers may insist on unreasonable delivery 
times and quantities or provide inaccurate forecasts (Grant & Torgersen, 2006) that lead to 
demand amplification of upstream orders versus actual sales, or the infamous ‘bullwhip 
effect’ (Lee, Padmanabhan, & Whang, 1997). 
 An ideal where power is equally shared is found when both the buyer and the seller 
have a ‘cooperative orientation:’ where there is social, long-term financial (i.e., shared 
investment), and confidential information exchange across the dyadic relationship between 
buyer and seller (Ojansivu, Alajoutsijärvi, & Salo, 2013). However, while retailers have used 
their power over suppliers in some cases (Spekman et al., 1998; Grant, 2005), 
competitiveness in the UK grocery retail market has led some retailers but many suppliers 
and logistics service providers to consider how they can collaborate to keep costs down and 
retain a competitive advantage (Grant et al., 2008). 
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2.2. Supply chain collaboration and the retail grocery sector 
Fernie & Grant (2008) note there has been considerable change in the past 30 years in retail 
grocery supply chains, from supplier-led to retailer or buyer-led. In the early 1980s, grocery 
retailers shifted from direct store delivery to regionally controlled distribution centres; soon 
after, unprecedented levels of efficiency began to emerge as retailers massively reduced their 
inventory levels and lead times. Further efficiencies and cost reductions occurred when 
retailers turned to logistics service providers to handle supply chain services for them on a 
dedicated basis. In the 1990s, retailers moved away from product-specific warehousing to 
multi-temperature composite warehousing and distribution, which further reduced supply 
chain inventory levels through just-in-time collaborative approaches such as efficient 
consumer response or pilot collaborative, planning, forecasting, and replenishment initiatives 
(Barratt, 2004). 
 The collaboration inherent in some of these approaches worked to enhance the 
innovation and performance of the collaborating firms (Soosay, Hyland, & Ferrer, 2008). But 
it also demanded a shift in culture, toward one that prioritised not just collaboration but also 
trust, mutuality, and information exchange, with senior management support and sufficient 
resources (Barratt, 2004; Lindgreen et al., 2009). Conversely, managerial inertia and a focus 
on parochial, short-term results negatively affected performance and customer service, thus 
creating conflicts in the supply chain (Simatupang & Sridharan, 2002). Nor could 
collaborative frameworks based solely on marginal relationships deliver superior 
performance (Bailey & Evans, 2006). 
 Collaboration among supply chain partners also underlies more general supply chain 
management notions, including the overarching, total systems perspective that includes 
relationship management across network firms, purchasing, customer service, and cost 
control, all to attain total supply chain satisfaction (Mason et al., 2007). 
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2.3. Vertical and horizontal collaboration in the retail grocery sector 
In supply chains, collaboration can take two forms: vertical or horizontal (Barratt, 2004; 
Simatupang & Sridharan, 2002), however vertical collaboration among suppliers, 
intermediaries, and retailers is more common. Stephens and Wright (2002) and Hingley et al. 
(2011) both found that food retailers express virtually no interest in wider, deeper, multiple-
retailer horizontal collaborations because they fear the loss of their competitive advantage. 
And yet both forms of collaboration rely on the use of logistics service providers to operate 
effectively. 
 For example, Fernie & McKinnon (2003) argue that more efficient collaboration 
among suppliers would encourage greater collaboration among distributors, and Mason et al. 
(2007) show how horizontal collaboration increases the flexibility that firms have to combine 
and share capabilities, such as through centralization, Internet-based tracking systems, shared 
pallet networks, or regional and central distribution hubs. Thus the profusion of logistics 
service providers creates vast opportunities for collaboration across the supply chain, 
implying the promise of improved optimization (Whiteoak, 2004). Some authors also warn of 
precarious multi-party relationships with primary producers (e.g., Robson & Rawnsley, 2001; 
Grant, 2005; Hingley, 2005; Kumar, 2005; Aastrup, Grant, & Bjerre, 2007). According to 
Stephens (2006), collaboration is possible only if external factors, such as resource shortages, 
legislation, or social and environmental pressures, exert such a strong influence that retailers 
cannot control the situation. Stephens also concludes that horizontal collaboration is more 
likely if brokered by a third party. 
 While modern, global supply chains require a significant amount of vertical 
collaboration, genuine, two-way, interactive partnerships do not tend to occur naturally 
(Robson & Rawnsley, 2001). Collins and Burt (1999) assert that risk in vertical supply chains 
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is asymmetric, so a broad retailing business is likely to survive the loss of a supplier, whereas 
the consequences for a supplier that loses a key retailer are much more serious. 
 
2.4. The role of the intermediary 
Further support for the foregoing view emerges from vertical chain initiatives such as 
category management, which moves more risk to a preferred supplier and away from the 
retailer (Allen, 2001). A preferred supplier takes responsibility for the entire supply chain in a 
particular product category and aims to maximise sales and profitability by adopting an end-
consumer orientation. For its part, the retailer reduces the number of its suppliers and aims to 
guarantee consistency rather than rely on varying qualities and specifications from different 
suppliers engaged in continual renegotiations. The benefits of the category management and 
preferred-reduced supplier cohort approach is exemplified with respect to Tesco’s meat 
supply chain and its enhanced relationships with principal intermediaries discussed in 
Lindgreen & Hingley (2003); whereby both parties are seen to gain from the relationship.  
But, critics of category management contend that it reinforces retailer power and control 
(Dapiran & Hogarth-Scott, 2003; Duffy, Fearne, & Hornibrook, 2003).  
 However, when responsibilities devolve, such that a preferred or nominated lead 
supplier dominates a group of products, the benefits can accrue for both the suppliers and the 
retailer. Previous discussions of ‘channel captains’ (Fearne & Hughes, 1999) and ‘super-
middleman’ roles (Hingley, 2005) highlight the mutual benefits available through ‘partnered’ 
relationships, despite overall imbalances in power. Suppliers engaged in category 
management roles might actually enjoy positive empowerment (Hingley, 2005), with returns 
in the form of power and authority when intermediaries perform an enhanced role together 
with retailers. More generally though, the outcome, as Hingley et al. (2006) reveal, is that 
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suppliers tend to accept asymmetrical power imbalances, in return for regular retailer 
business.  
What is apparent in the discussion of intermediaries’ roles in grocery supply chains 
and managing grocery sector relationships is that the intermediaries concerned (e.g., super 
middlemen, category leaders, and so forth) are primarily contract suppliers, and the key 
interface is the predominant dyadic and vertical structure between that supplier (and its wider 
lead-intermediary co-ordinated supply network) with the retailer. Despite identification of 
some benefits of regular and consistent business for suppliers as intermediaries, and thereby 
subsequent benefits in transaction cost reduction (Hingley, 2005), the emphasis primarily is 
still on (backward) channel determination from the retailer. Of under-explored interest is the 
role performed by logisticians and logistics service structures in facilitating intermediary 
roles. This perhaps may offer a fundamentally more ‘independent’ one than that operated by 
supplier-based intermediaries. 
 
3. Logistics service providers as enablers of collaboration 
Logistics service providers range from simple hired-transport arrangements to contracts with 
third-party logistics (3PLs) or fourth-party logistics (4PLs) service providers. The use of 
3PLs relates to the phenomena of outsourcing; firms rely on an outsourced logistics provider 
to manage the entire logistics process neutrally. Logistics outsourcing often involves various 
forms, including transportation, warehousing, forwarding, brokering, reverse logistics 
services, and information technology. 
 A 4PL offers an extension to the third-party logistics concept and differs in several 
ways (Win, 2008; Papadopoulou, Manthou, & Vlachopoulou, 2013). First, the 4PL is often a 
separate entity, established as a joint venture or long-term contract between a primary buyer 
and one or more partners, though it also is possible for a major 3PL to form a 4PL 
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organisation within its existing structure. Second, the 4PL acts as a single interface between 
the buyer and multiple logistics service providers; ideally, it manages all aspects of the 
buyer’s supply chain. Third, the 4PL inherently aims to establish a comprehensive supply 
chain solution rather than just improve the efficiency of physical logistics operations, as a 
3PL provider would. Thus, unlike 3PL service provision, 4PL combines process, technology, 
and management to provide added-value for the hiring firm (Mukhopadhyay, 2006; Win, 
2008). 
An example of how a 4PL can provide added-value beyond simply organising other 
3PLs and managing them is the service provided by Clipper Logistics in the UK for George 
Clothing, which is the first UK supermarket clothing brand and founded by George Davies in 
1990 and purchased by Asda in 1995 (Clipper Logistics, 2014). George has grown to become 
the largest clothing retailer by volume in the UK today and sells a wide range of fashionable, 
yet affordable, ladies wear, menswear, kids wear and footwear in Asda stores in the UK and 
online at www.george.com. The brand is also traded internationally by Asda’s owner Wal-
Mart. 
Clipper receives stock from all of George’s 15 different global locations. On arrival at 
port of entry in the UK stock is unloaded for transportation by road to the Deconsolidation 
Centers. Stock arriving at Darlington is ready for processing in either hanging or boxed 
delivery, and is checked against the purchase order for quantity and quality. The stock then 
goes through a process of de-boxing, processing and picking ready for transportation to 
George’s designated DC or direct to store. Clipper also provides a photography service to 
post photos of garments on mannequin on the George Clothing website, and offers a 
specialist returns management process which includes checking quarantine and remedial re-
work to meet George’s exact needs. The Darlington site provides leading operational 
standards and innovative solutions for George and handles more than 55 million units per 
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year. Additionally, Clipper’s Leeds site manages enhanced processing within the George 
network, including flat to hanging processing and additional refurbishment such as applying 
price labels, swing tickets, care labels, security tags, re-boxing and manual bagging, and 
steaming and pressing garments to the required standard (Clipper Logistics, 2014). 
 All parties in a 4PL arrangement usually contribute equity and distribution assets, 
such as systems capability, strategy development, and process reengineering skills. Physical 
distribution management staff from the buyer may relocate to the new firm, which represents 
a strategic rather than tactical partner and supply chain orchestrator. This new firm uses its 
knowledge to manage and integrate the supply chain and turns to specialist providers of 
logistics services if it lacks a certain needed expertise or capacity. 
 In this sense, the nature of a 4PL is similar to a lead logistics partner that organises 
other third-party logistics partners to outsource logistics functions. However, because a 4PL 
combines a buyer’s in-house resources and capabilities with those of outside agencies, it 
controls the supply chain for the buyer. The 4PL also can take a lead role in creating value, 
such as by undertaking the assembly of finished goods on behalf of buyers. Most 4PLs 
operate nearly virtually and do not own assets, unlike a 3PL. Instead, they make very intense 
use of technology and software to manage their outsourced and supply chain processes. 
According to Christopher (2010), such a joint venture likely contains four key components: 
systems architecture and integration skills; a supply chain control room; the ability to capture 
and utilize information and knowledge across the network; and access to best-of-breed asset 
providers. 
 Existing physical distribution networks operated by individual retailers already 
incorporate these components, which suggest minimal technical barriers. Electronic 
communication systems already link 3PL suppliers and retailers through the electronic data 
interchange that supports efficient consumer response techniques. In addition, the highly 
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specific nature of assets involved in a joint venture should negate the likelihood of 
opportunistic behaviour (Bourlakis & Bourlakis, 2005). In an automotive industry setting, 
Dyer (1997) found that transaction costs fall when firms with high asset specificity enter 
partnerships. Major grocery retailers have honed such system innovations; car manufacturers 
even use processes perfected by retailers (Truss et al., 2006).  
 Because 4PLs produce efficiency, effectiveness, and better economic performance 
(i.e., profitability), they might further encourage collaboration among retail buyers. One 
example here is from the industrial sector, in the 4PL relationship managed by steel producer 
Corus (Tata) and TDG 4PL where TDG were able to provide independent central control of 
existing hauliers and their relationship with Corus; in order to provide profitable efficiency 
savings (FBP, 2010). Hence, 4PLs offer independent and objective execution of logistics and 
supply chain activities which establishes them as ‘honest brokers’ in relation to individual 
buyers or customers. 
 Another example related to economic is Clipper Logistics and George of Asda 
discussed above. The Distribution Director of Asda notes that “the deconsolidation operations 
at Darlington have created significant efficiencies across the business both in terms of minimising 
costs and in reducing our environmental impact” (Clipper Logistics, 2014). Further, Clipper’s 
success with Asda and other retailers such as Tesco has seen them successfully raise £100 million 
through an initial public offering (IPO) of shares on the London Stock Exchange in late May 
2014. The IPO price was around £1.135 per share and in mid-June 2014 shares were trading at 
£1.385, representing a percentage increase of 22% in almost a month (Hargreaves Lansdown, 
2014). 
 Accordingly, 4PLs might overcome a major stumbling block in the grocery sector to 
collaboration, namely the retailers’ willingness to engage in such joint ventures (Grant et al., 
2008; Hingley et al., 2011), due to parochialism, inter-firm conflicts, or competing interests. 
Scepticism, however, remains high (Grant et al., 2008; Hingley et al., 2011) despite the 
14 
 
widespread application of some vertical collaboration between retailers and suppliers in 
mature grocery supply chain systems, retailers continue to resist deeper vertical collaboration, 
as well as horizontal and network integration. 
 This resistance may reflect a lack of ability, interest, or determination, or perhaps it 
simply implies that powerful retailers in a gatekeeper role block collaboration to protect their 
own self-interest. Notwithstanding, there are some recent examples where collaborative 
efforts are providing dividends for smaller suppliers of fresh produce (Hingley, Lindgreen & 
Beverland, 2010; Hingley, 2011) and local food suppliers of regional products (Hingley, 
2010); these products are finding more favour with consumers after recent food security and 
safety issues. 
 Regardless of the reasons for the aforementioned resistance, we contend it is time to 
change current physical distribution management structures associated with grocery and 
wider retail supply chains. In particular, a recent study of supplier–retailer–logistics service 
provider relationships indicates the potential for increased asset utilization and the 
marketability of a more environmentally sound approach to physical distribution management 
(Hingley et al., 2011). These findings resonate with findings regarding the benefits of 
innovation and collaboration in retail supply chains (Bailey & Evans; 2006; Barratt, 2004; 
Simatupang & Sridharan, 2002). 
 Retailer reticence likely relates to power or control issues (Grant, 2005; Hingley, 
2005; Kumar, 2005; Spekman et al., 1998), which exert detrimental effects on the retailer-
supplier dynamic. Retailers have reached their current positions through significant 
horizontal mergers and acquisitions rather than friendly collaboration; they also may have 
reached a point of saturation, especially when legislation aims to ensure competitive markets 
(Competition Commission, 2000) and activists make claims for consumer welfare (Blythman, 
2007; Simms, 2007). 
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 Finally, better physical distribution management can offer far more to retailers than 
efficiencies and effectiveness (Grant, 2005; Hingley et al., 2011). Grocery retailers value 
service levels and jealously guard sensitive sales information, so it is difficult to envisage any 
situation in which they would collaborate so much that they shared physical distribution 
management with suppliers. Such gatekeepers and their channel captains may be motivated 
more by safeguards against competition than by collaborative savings; as Hingley et al. 
(2010) show, powerful channel members can ‘block’ collaborative activity by suppliers to 
maintain their status quo supply arrangements and thereby retain more channel power and 
control.  
 To allay these concerns, retailers might implement collaboration, and by extension 
appropriate and improve their supplier relationships, by using a 4PL that acts as an ‘honest 
broker’ and mediates the relationship with suppliers. Retail buyers first would need to 
consider what type of logistics service provider engagement they need; the typology in Figure 
1 (based on work regarding strategic suppliers by Hingley et al. [2011] and Kaufman, Wood, 
& Theryel [2000]) denotes how collaboration may be considered in terms of axes of intensity 
(or level) of collaboration and complexity (or level) of collaborative distribution. 
{Take in Figure 1 here} 
 In this context, the intensity of collaboration means that from low to high the 
number and type of relationships become more intense; that is, the logistics service provider 
is required to become more involved in the retailer’s physical distribution management 
operations and becomes an ‘order maker’ as opposed to an ‘order taker’ (Holter et al., 2010). 
The complexity of collaborative distribution means that from low to high the relationship 
between the logistics service provider and the retailer becomes deeper due to the increased 
complexity of the physical distribution management network or supply chain (Grant et al., 
2008). 
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 At low levels of complexity and collaboration intensity, implying a less mature 
supply chain, a transactional 3PL may suffice. This Type 1 relationship is transactional in 
nature and akin to Cox’s (2004) non-adversarial arms-length relationship where the current 
market price and contractual transactions prevail. If distribution complexity increases, a 
relational 3PL arrangement may be more appropriate. This Type 2 relationship is akin to 
Cox’s (2004) non-adversarial arms-length relationship where there is a transparent 
operational manner with long-term relationship commitments. However, if there is high 
intensity, such as in a mature supply chain, a complete 4PL arrangement may be appropriate, 
whether the 4PL provides physical distribution management on an arm’s-length basis for the 
buyer and solves problems in a minimally collaborative distribution environment (Type 3) or 
becomes a specialist or consultant (Type 4). These two types of relationships go beyond 
Cox’s (2004) model and represent two new styles of a triadic relationship wherein the 4PL 
works primarily with the retailer but provides significant value-added services by acting as a 
‘channel captain’ (Fearne & Hughes, 1999) for the retailer’s other logistics service providers 
and suppliers. Thus, the adapted typology in Figure 1 offers a useful methodological process 
for all logistics service providers, whether 3PL only or 4PL, to determine the nature of their 
service offering and how they might suggest enhancing collaboration for their customers. 
 Further, we also present in Figure 2 a model for structuring a physical distribution 
management system with logistics service providers in a grocery retail supply chain, based on 
Hingley’s (2005) concept of supplier super-middlemen. In this case the logistics service 
provider collaborates with three retailers (X, Y, and Z) and manages the physical distribution 
management with three types of suppliers: overseas suppliers, primary producers in the home 
country, and specialist or local producers, thereby progressing this model as one which 
represents a more independent and interdependent intermediary role based around logistics 
service providers, rather than solely suppliers. 
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{Take in Figure 2 here} 
 In practice, logistics service providers usually provide basic, low-intensity 
collaborative services, such as transport, storage, and breaking bulk loads or consolidating 
loads to send to retailer regional distribution centres, especially from primary suppliers in the 
home country, on a Type 1 basis. They also might attend to activities such sourcing and 
qualifying suppliers, particularly overseas suppliers, through the auspices of the British Retail 
Consortium Global Standards for food, packing and materials, and storage and distribution 
(BRC, 2011), which implies a Type 2 or Type 3 basis. 
 However, Figure 2 shows that logistics service providers could coordinate direct 
deliveries from overseas suppliers to regional distribution centres for retailers X and Y, for 
products such as fresh produce that do not need to be processed by the logistics service 
provider and are time-sensitive or perishable. Thus, supply in this context could also follow a 
Type 4 approach for smaller, local suppliers of regional products for retailer Z; as issues of 
local supply have become highly relevant in response to quality and environmental concerns 
(Hingley, 2011), and a counter-trend to national and globalized supply. 
 
4. Conclusions 
We turned to studies in the areas of supply, relationship, and supply chain management as a 
good foundation for our investigation of the relatively under-researched concept of 
collaboration and relational activity in UK retail grocery supply chains. Relationships 
embedded in organizational structures associated with powerful retailer-endorsed 
intermediaries (whether they serve as preferred suppliers, category leaders, ‘channel 
captains,’ or ‘super-middlemen’) have been investigated previously, but with a focus 
primarily on the dyadic interface between supplier or intermediary and the retailer via 
predominantly vertical co-ordination. The horizontal channel element of these structures is 
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less understood, relegated to the will of powerful retail buyers. Many such so-called 
partnering (power-imbalanced) arrangements can deliver an enhanced return to suppliers, but 
the structures remain resolutely backwardly vertically controlled, with a dyadic interface. 
Hence, considerably less is known about collaborative and relational implications in a retail 
grocery supply chain context.  
 In this article we have contributed to this debate by identifying a special opportunity 
for collaboration to enable this activity in the retail grocery sector; that is, logistics service 
providers engaged by the retailers or buyers can be an intermediary to link with suppliers. 
The intermediary role in category management or super-middleman scenarios is tempered by 
the retailer’s vertical control, but a 4PL is an ‘honest broker’ and thus offers a framework for 
co-ordination that is less dominated by channel and network power plays. 
 The success of this arrangement depends on the influences of supply chain costs and 
whether retailers are prepared to place the co-ordination of their logistical relationships in the 
hands of overarching logistics service providers, as in the 4PL scenarios, to save on those 
costs. The trigger point arises with the rapidly increasing costs for logistics and relationship 
management, creating the argument for shared supply chain resources. It is an even more 
likely prospect in an age of rising energy and associated costs to move goods globally. 
However, caution is necessary when considering the real possibility of channel power plays 
and blockades of chain and network structural innovations by powerful members who wish to 
retain authority and control. Still, the distinct possibility of added relationship value, along 
with cost reduction benefits from shared resources, indicates the promise of a successful 
relationship outcome from horizontal supply chain structures. 
 Horizontal collaborative structures have been under-researched, while dyadic 
relationships and vertical co-ordination have dominated theory and practice. Thus, we call for 
ongoing practical development of the horizontal dimension of chain and network 
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relationships through logistics service providers that play coordinating roles with retailers, 
perhaps in 4PL arrangements. There are several benefits to both retailers and suppliers in 
doing so. One is that the intermediaries as ‘honest brokers’ can help ensure quality standards 
are met and maintained in complex food supply chains that are under pressure to reduce 
costs, particularly in the public or catering sectors. Recent issues regarding sub-standard or 
poor quality food finding its way into the food supply chain and being sold at retailers (e.g. 
the ‘horsegate’ scandal of 2013) are due to complex supply chains and indeterminate 
suppliers in some cases. Another benefit is that an ‘honest broker’ intermediary can provide a 
holistic view of the retail supply chain from retailer or buyer through tier 1 and possibly tier 2 
suppliers in order to enable effective and efficient supply chain activities to reduce costs. 
As with all articles there are limitations. This article is primarily conceptual but 
derives the frameworks presented herein from the few previous empirical studies that have 
been conducted. Further empirical investigations should be undertaken in the retail grocery 
sector as well as and wider sectoral contexts to validate or refute our notions and/or 
frameworks. Having said that, we consider grocery supply collaboration and relationships are 
typical of other sectors, featuring common issues of communication, relationship 
coordination, power dependence, and so forth. Finally, it would be helpful to explore the 
boundaries of the trade-off that retailers (or other predominant chain and network power 
brokers) make between the advantages of horizontal coordination (relationships, shared 
facility cost savings) and their existing desire for vertically coordinated control. 
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Figure 1: Proposed typology for logistics service provider collaboration  
Adapted from Kaufman et al. (2000) and Hingley et al. (2011) 
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Denotes direct supplier-retailer connection 
Denotes supplier-logistics service provider connection 
Denotes logistics service provider-retail connection 
 
Figure 2: Domain of a logistics service provider acting as intermediary 
Adapted from Hingley (2005) 
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